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MULTI-VENUE AND THE OBSCENITY STATUTES
The past century has witnessed a tremendous increase in the
volume of criminal prosecutions initiated in the federal courts, and in
the character and range of prosecutions as well. As indicated by
Professor Schwartz, early federal criminal legislation was primarily
"self-defensive"--i.e., it was concerned with protecting peculiarly
federal functions.' Typical were statutes aimed at the punishment of
revenue frauds and of direct interference with federal courts and justice
through bribery and perjury. Only after the Civil War "did the
federal criminal law make its first substantial ventures beyond the
punishment of acts directly injurious to the central government." 2
This was in the form of two Reconstruction enactments:
In the Civil Rights legislation individuals were protected,
under certain circumstances creating federal jurisdiction,
against assault, murder, and threats. The Post Office Code
of 1872 afforded the protection of federal criminal law against
moral corruption and financial depredation, upon a showing
that postal facilities had been used to promote fraud or
lotteries, or to disseminate obscenity.'
This trend toward expanding federal criminal jurisdiction has con-
tinued down to the present, buttressed most often not by explicit grants
of power by the Constitution, but rather by the power of Congress "to
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" ' those powers directly conferred by the Constitution.
Since expansion of federal jurisdiction frequently is employed as a
way of reaching criminal behavior with which individual states are
unable to cope effectively, a very large number of federal prosecutions
involve crimes with multiple state contacts.' The problem of laying and
justifying venue in such cases has been severe and recurring.
The basic constitutional requirements as to venue are set down in
two separate provisions. Article III, section 2, clause 3 provides:
1 Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 LAw
& CONThmp. PRoB. 64, 65 (1948).
2 Ibid.
8Ibid.
4 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
G Abrams, Conspiracy and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The
Crine Committed Formula, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 751, 752 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Abrams].
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The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where
the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place
or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Additionally, the sixth amendment states that "in all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law . . . . " Article III may be viewed as a true criminal venue
provision, setting as the proper place of trial the state in which the
crime was committed.' It "is undoubtedly a limit on the power of
Congress to define the place within which a crime shall be deemed to
have been committed," ' at least where the crime in question has clearly
been committed in only a single state or federal district. If the crime,
however, proves to have contacts with more than one state or district,
then the venue protection of the Constitution, under the impact of re-
strictive judicial interpretation of what the Constitution requires. may
become essentially illusory. As the Supreme Court has stated, under
article III and the sixth amendment, "the venue of trial is thereby pre-
determined, but those provisions do not furnish guidance for the
determination of the place of the crime." 8 Therefore, in establishing
the proper place of prosecution, Congress constitutionally may provide
that a crime committed partly in one state and partly in another may
be tried in either, and that a so-called continuing offense may be tried
in any state in which any part of the offense has occurred. Congress
6 Orfield, Venue of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. Prrr. L. Rtv. 375, 379 (1956).
The sixth amendment is, strictly speaking, a vichage rather than a venue pro-
vision, since it merely denotes the place from which a jury in a criminal trial will
be drawn. Nevertheless, the amendment is often construed as guaranteeing a trial
in the district and carries the effect of a venue provision for "if the defendant asserts
his constitutional right to a trial by jury of the vicinage, he may not be tried in any
district other than that in which the crime was committed since only there can such
a jury be impaneled." Id. at 380. With respect to the sixth amendment, then, the
right to be tried in the vicinage may be viewed as secondary and incidental to the
primary right to trial by a jury of the vicinage. Comment, 46 MIcH. L. :Rxv. 964
(1948).
These general constitutional provisions are in turn implemented by Rule 18 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which echoes the "crime committed" language
of the Constitution, providing:
Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution
shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed. The court shall
fix the place of trial within the district with due regard to the convenience
of the defendant and the witnesses.
The exception referred to in the first sentence of the rule is meant to provide for
those crimes not committed within any state (such as crimes upon the high seas),
and for change of venue when allowed by Rule 21. See text accompanying note 96
infra.
7
ROTTSCHAEFER, AmmucAN CONSTIrTioNAL LAW 728 (1939).
sJohnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 220 (1956).
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has taken advantage of such judicial interpretations by legislating a
large number of offenses which may be deemed "continuing" or "multi-
venue" by virtue of being denoted by what one writer has called a
"movement verb"-i.e., a verb which can be subjected to a "continuing"
interpretation.9 Illustrative of the many statutory verbs which have
been interpreted as implying a continuing offense are "transport," "
"use" - and "remain." 12 The result of such an approach has been
to create, as will be shown later in this Comment," apparent incon-
sistencies and confusion in the decided cases. Thus, Dobie, in his
famous caveat, instructs the practitioner:
All federal crimes are statutory, and these crimes are often
defined, hidden away amid pompous verbosity in terms of a
single verb. That essential verb usually contains the key to
the . . . question: In what district was the crime com-
mitted? .... .. When as is so often the case, the statute
enumerates several such verbs, only scrupulous, even meticu-
lous, nicety in exact quotation can prevent these statutes, as
well as the decisions under them, from proving a snare and
a delusion to the unwary. 4
The effect of construing the constitutional provisions so as to
allow for continuing offenses has been to confer upon Congress a
relatively broad power, within the limits imposed by the constitutional
requirements, to determine the venue of multi-district crimes by
designating the locality of the crime. Congress has exercised this
power by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1964), a general venue statute
intended to be broadly applicable to multi-district and continuing
offenses. This statute provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of
Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one
district and completed in another, or committed in more than
one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any
district in which such offense was begun, continued, or
completed.
Any offense involving the use of the mails, or trans-
portation in interstate or foreign commerce, is a continuing
9 Abrams 791.
10 Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 72 (1908) (interpreting
the Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847 (1903), 49 U.S.C. §§41-43 (1964)).
11United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160, 167 (N.D. Iowa), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 956 (1965) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1964)).
12United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958) (interpreting §252(c) of the
Immigration & Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 220 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1282(c) (1964)).
13 See section II infra.
14 Don, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 511 (1928).
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offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enact-
ment of Congress, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any
district from, through, or into which such commerce or mail
matter moves.
It will be seen that multi-venue offenses generally fall into two broad
groups: (a) those crimes begun in one district and completed in
another, as provided for in the first paragraph of section 3237; and
(b) the so-called continuing offenses, as set down in the second para-
graph of section 3237. Thus "where an essential act-element of an
offense, committed in one district, can be described as continued or
repeated in other districts, a court may conclude that trial may be had
wherever the element is thus continued or repeated." 15
The constitutionality of the continuing or multi-venue offense
concept has repeatedly been upheld by the Supreme Court." However,
the concept, though undoubtedly constitutionally valid in many contexts,
has been applied to continually widening areas of the criminal law, with
little attention or critical concern being given, either by the courts
or by Congress, to the underlying rationale of the concept or its ap-
propriateness for characterizing particular kinds of criminal offenses.
The courts have generally glossed over the serious constitutional venue
problems raised by such a concept, concentrating upon the explicit lan-
guage of applicable constitutional provisions without due regard to the
underlying spirit of these provisions or to the potential abuses which
the framers of the Constitution sought to prevent.
A typical instance of such indiscriminate extension of the multi-
venue concept by Congress occurred in 1958 in connection with the
federal obscenity statutes.17  The obscenity statutes had been held con-
15 Abrams 790.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958) ; Armour Packing Co. v.
United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908).
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-62 (1964). Section 1461 provides in pertinent part:
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter,
thing, device, or substance; and-- . .
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertise-
ment, or notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where,
or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters,
articles, or things may be obtained . . .
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the mails,
or delivery of anything declared by this section to be nonmailable . . . or
knowingly takes any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating
or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both . . ..
Section 1462 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever brings into the United States . . . or knowingly uses any
express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign
commerce-
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stitutional prior to 1958 in Roth v. United States,' on the ground
that obscene matter was not constitutionally protected. However, a re-
strictive interpretation of venue by the Tenth Circuit in United States
v. Ross 9 led Congress, in 1958, to change the offense into a continuing
one (essentially, by the simple expedient of substituting the verb "uses"
for the verb "deposits" in the text of the statute). This drastically
broadened the venue choice available to the prosecution in a case in-
volving the mailing of obscenity by bringing the offense under the
general venue provision of section 3237.
The propriety of this congressional action will soon be reviewed
by the federal courts. In late 1965, two book publishers and dis-
tributors brought mandamus proceedings in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to compel the convening
of a three-judge district court for purposes of determining the con-
stitutionality of the 1958 amendments to the federal obscenity laws."0
The court has ordered the convening of the panel, commenting that "an
attack on a statute which would permit the prosecution a multiple
choice of venue in this protected area of First Amendment freedoms is
not patently frivolous. Such choice could induce the publisher to
engage in self-censorship and thus restrict the public's access to pro-
tected publications." 21 It seems likely that the decision handed down
by this panel will have serious and widespread implications for the
future development of obscenity law,22 and perhaps for the entire
concept of continuing offenses as well.
(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, motion-
picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of
indecent character . . .
Whoever knowingly takes from such express company or other common
carrier any matter or thing the carriage of which is herein made unlawful-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both ....
1s 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1) 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953).
20 Reed Enterprises v. Corcoran, 354 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The publishers alleged that the amendments
purport to permit the prosecution of alleged violators at either the place
of mailing or at the place of delivery or at any other place through which
material passes, thus allegedly authorizing arbitrary forum-picking by
federal prosecutors and the institution of multiple prosecutions for identical
material in districts far removed from the residences and places of busi-
ness of alleged violators.
Id. at 520. The petitioners further alleged that the statutory permission for forum-
picking embodied in the 1958 amendments
constitutes an unlawful interference with and abridgement and denial of
the freedom of the press in violation of the First Amendment; deprives
persons, including these plaintiffs, of their liberty and property without
due process of law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and deprives
persons of their rights to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution guaranteed
by the provisions of the Sixth Amendment
Ibid.
2 1 Id. at 522.
22 The interesting history of these 'statutes is set forth in PAuL & ScH-WARTz,
FEm,.AL CENSORSHIP: OBScENrrY IN THE MAIL (1961).
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that "questions of venue in crim-
inal cases . . . are not merely matters of formal legal procedure. They
raise deep issues of public policy in the light of which legislation must
be construed." 23 Never is this more true than when the question
asked is: Can the continuing offense concept be extended into the
sensitive area of first amendment freedoms without endangering those
freedoms and the venue guarantees of article III and the sixth amend-
ment? Answering this question in the negative, this Comment will
explore the present status of the continuing and multi-venue offense
concept in general and its effect on the obscenity laws in particular.
This will be done in an attempt to show that, in the area of obscenity
law, the trend to more liberal venue statutes and judicial interpretation
of venue provisions has resulted in a serious dilution of traditional
constitutional protections not only of venue but of free speech as well.
However, first it is necessary to understand the functions which the
constitutional provisions were intended to serve, as viewed in the con-
text of their historical background. The Comment will, therefore, first
look at the historical sources of the traditional English requirement
of a jury of the vicinage, the influence which the English form of jury
trial exerted on the framers of the constitutional provisions, and the
events which impelled the framers to retain and deeply to imbed the
vicinage requirement in our own constitutional scheme.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
It is generally agreed that in interpreting the sixth amendment and
article III, "the scope of the right protected by these provisions is to be
determined by reference to the meanings of 'jury' and 'trial by jury'
affixed to them in the law of England and the states at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution." 24 That it was clearly intended by
the Crown that basic rights granted by the English law should follow
the colonists to America can be seen as early as the Elizabethan patents
to Gilbert and Raleigh in which it was essentially guaranteed that
colonists would possess the same fundamental rights as were enjoyed
by other Englishmen.25 Similar guarantees are to be found in the
later charters. By the time of the colonization of America, these rights
were undoubtedly believed by most Englishmen to include the right to
a trial by jury. Thus, Story has said:
It was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in
the parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and
political liberties, and watched with an unceasing jealousy and
solicitude. The right constitutes one of the fundamental
23 United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944).
24 RorTscHAEERt, op. cit. supra note 7, at 785.
25 HEua, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 113-14 (1951) [here-
inafter cited as HzEaI].
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articles of Magna Charta . . . . When our more immediate
ancestors removed to America, they brought this great priv-
ilege with them, as their birthright and inheritance, as a part
of that admirable common law, which had fenced round and
interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of
arbitrary power.26
In attributing the source of the right to trial by jury to Magna Charta,
Story was merely reflecting an historical misconception which was
current during the entire colonial period and which was also to be
found in Blackstone.27  However, in view of the reverence which
Englishmen felt toward Magna Charta, the significance of the gen-
erally held belief that trial by jury was among the fundamental rights
guaranteed by that document is far more important than the fact that
this was an historical error.
It seems generally agreed today that, contrary to the colonial view,
the sources of the right to trial by jury are to be found in the early
ninth century in the royal prerogatives of the Frankish kings by which
the king's officers would summon twelve men of the neighborhood to
answer questions put to them in the king's name.29 This procedure
was initially administrative in nature rather than judicial, limited in
scope and concerned primarily with title to land and revenues. It was
gradually extended, however, into wider areas of royal concern,
eventually including inquiry into criminal activity. Thus, by the time
of the Assizes of Clarendon in 1166, a system of inquisitions had been
established as part of the machinery of criminal law, and by the middle
of the thirteenth century the inquest, a forerunner of the present grand
jury, was made a regular procedure by Henry II. The grand jury,
which was drawn from the county, "could not inquire of any offense
done in another county." 29 Its task was by presentment to establish
the prima facie guilt of the accused.
There soon developed a serious gap in available methods of
proving guilt. This void, created by the abolition of the old forms of
trial,30 came to be filled by the predecessor of the present jury:
2 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 587-88
(3d ed. 1858).
274 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349.
28 See HELLER 6.
294 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *303.
30 During the period when the early inquest was still primarily limited to ad-
ministrative concerns, criminal liability was decided by recourse to battle, ordeal or
compurgation (oath-helpers). Trial by battle eventually gave rise to the use of
champions and compurgation to the futile pitting of oath-helper against oath-helper.
These procedures were gradually perceived to be irrational and were eliminated. In
1166, by the Assize of Clarendon, the scope of compurgation was greatly limited.
Moreover, in 1215 Pope Innocent III removed religious endorsement from the ordeal,
practically abolishing it as a trial device.
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a body of neighbors called in, either by express law, or by the
consent of the parties to decide disputed questions of fact . . .
because they were already acquainted with the facts .
or if not already so acquainted with them, because they might
easily acquire the necessary knowledge."
Since the early petit jurors were primarily witnesses rather than
judges, they had to be drawn from the immediate vicinity of the crime."
The administration of criminal justice, therefore, was necessarily
centered at the county level. Criminal cases had to be initiated by
presentment in the county in which the crime was committed, and the
king's itinerant justices, empowered by royal commissions, traveled
to the counties. "The general result of this system of commissions
was that a great deal of royal justice was done not by the permanent
central courts, but in the counties, by commissioners sent out just for
that occasion." 3
This system of local criminal justice contained a broad implica-
tion which has not generally been appreciated: the result of requiring
the use of local juries was concomitantly to introduce a democratic and
representative quality into the administration of the criminal law.
"From these beginnings as an administrative machine for extorting
truth on any matter of royal concern from a reluctant countryside, the
jury soon acquired a representative character." 34 Indeed, as has been
indicated by Maitland, "the whole system of trial by jury in its earliest
form implies representation-a person is tried by the county, by the
neighbourhood . . . . The voice of the jurors is the verdict of the
country . . . ,"  Nor from an early time was the right to a repre-
sentative jury of one's peers limited to the royal court of the King's
Bench. Even in the manorial courts:
[W]hen the lord's interests were not concerned or were not
being actively asserted, the serf who sued or was sued in the
manorial court got the same justice as that which the free
man got; he got in theory the judgment, not of his lord, but
of a body of doomsmen who were at least his peers ...
[T]rial by jury gradually forced its way into the manorial
courts . . . . If a serf gets the verdict of his neighbours, he
31 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 156 (2d-ed. 1903).
Although initially the jury of the presentment was also the jury which determined
guilt, two separate juries were the rule by 1352, and a trial juror could be challenged
if he had served on the jury of presentment.
32 As witnesses, the jurors could be proceeded against for perjury (by attaint).
Although trial by jury was at first purely voluntary, by 1275 the Statute of West-
minster I subjected a defendant to the possibility of torture and imprisonment if he
refused "to put himself upon the country."
3 3
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 141 (1941).
34 PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 126 (2d ed. 1936).
35MATLAND, op. cit. supra note 33, at 71.
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gets as good a "judgment of his peers" as a free man will
get in the king's courts.36
The tendency to overlook the representative functions of the jury
has been an unfortunate by-product of the early historical texts' con-
cern with the witness function. It is to be admitted that such a re-
stricted view, if accurate, would reinforce any argument that vicinage
requirements are obsolete in a day when jurors no longer need bring
with them to the courtroom their own knowledge of the neighborhood.
But is such a view adequate to explain later English retention of trial
by jury of the vicinage? Although the process by which the jury be-
came transformed from witness to trier of facts was essentially com-
plete by the 1400's, the requirement of a jury of the vicinage was still
viable and staunchly defended by the time of the American Revolution.
Although the historical evidence is at best equivocal as to the actual
reason, is it not likely that, since by the mid-1400's the jury's function
had already been transformed from that of mere witness into impartial
weigher of evidence, the impetus toward preserving trial by a jury
of the vicinage had its source in something more fundamental than the
original necessity for having a panel familiar with the facts of the
offense? The possibility of mere inertia is not a convincing explanation
for the retention of the vicinage requirement in the absence of any
genuine need for it in an age of great social upheaval and innovation.
The essential nature of the jury which would appear logically to
explain the continued existence of the vicinage requirement in the
English system from the Middle Ages up until the American Revolution
is to be found in the representative character of the local jury. "This
idea of the jury representing the public of a particular locality had
enormous consequences in an age when representative institutions were
rapidly developing." 37 That there was an urgent need for the existence
of a representative jury becomes even more apparent when one con-
siders how heavily criminal procedures were weighted in favor of the
Crown. It was not, for example, until the 1700's that the rights to
counsel and to a copy of the indictment were extended to persons
accused of felonies other than treason. In such a climate of potential
injustice, the only protection an ordinary man had against government
arbitrariness and undue hardship was trial by jury in the vicinage.
In the American colonies, juries were impaneled from the earliest
period, although the jury trial of colonial days was "not a rigid copy
of its English prototype but rather the result of variegated experiences,
experimentation, and adaptation." 38  Explicit provision, however,
was often made for a jury of the vicinage. Thus Heller quotes chapter
XXII of the Charter of Fundamental Laws of West Jersey as providing
36 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 581-82 (1895).
37 PLUCKNETT, op. cit. supra note 34, at 126.
38 HFLLEk-15. - -
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in 1676 "that the Tryals of all causes civil and criminal, shall be heard
and decided by the virdict or judgment of twelve honest men of the
neighborhood, only to be summoned and presented by the sheriff of
that division, or propriety where the fact or trespass is committed." "
And similar provisions are found in the Fundamental Constitutions
for the Province of East Jersey (1683): "[A]ll tryals shall be by
twelve men, and as near as it may be, peers and equals, and of the
neighborhood, and men without just exception. . ... In Virginia,
the English requirement that the jury be drawn from the vicinage
was deviated from, as many cases were required to be tried in James-
town where a jury was selected from the court bystanders. In 1662,
however, the statute of 2 Hen. 63-64 required that at least six of the
jurors be from the neighborhood.
4
1
In the 1770's, as tensions grew between England and the colonies,
the Crown's attempts to deprive the rebellious colonists of trial in the
vicinage led to great anger and resentment. Widespread protests
greeted the Stamp Act, in which provision was made for revenue
offenses to be tried in the Admiralty Courts, where jury trial was
traditionally not available. On May 16, 1769, the Virginia House
of Burgesses met to protest against the transporting of Massachusetts
colonists to England for trial under a Parliamentary revival of an old
statute, 35 Henry 8, and drew up the Virginia Resolves, asserting that
"thereby the inestimable Privilege of being tried by a Jury from the
Vicinage, as well as the Liberty of summoning and producing Witnesses
on such Trial, will be taken away . . . " 42 The statute of 12 Geo. 3,
c. 24 (1772) made indictment and trial for certain offenses proper "in
any shire or county within this realm." The First Continental Con-
gress, in protesting against this enactment in 1774, again referred to
"the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of
the vicinage" in accordance with the requirements of English common
law, and asserted that the statute "deprives the American subject of a
constitutional trial by jury of the vicinage." 43 Again, in October,
1774, in the famous address to the Province of Quebec, the Continental
Congress, setting forth the "inalienable rights" of English subjects,
stated:
The next great right is that of trial by jury. This provides,
that neither life, liberty nor property, can be taken from the
possessor, until twelve of his unexceptionable countrymen and
peers of his vicinage, who from that neighbourhood may rea-
sonably be supposed to be acquainted with his character, and
39 Id. at 17.
40 Ibid.
41 Id. at 20.
42 Virginia Resolves of May 16, 1769, JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF
VIRGINIA, 1766-1769, at 214 (Kennedy ed. 1906).
43 COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS oF AmEIcAN HISToRY 83-84 (2d ed. 1940).
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the characters of the witnesses, upon a fair trial, and full
enquiry, face to face, in open Court before as many of the
people as chuse to attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath
against him .... "
And finally, in 1776, these continuing grievances culminated in
the Declaration of Independence, in which the Crown was condemned
"for transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses."
In view of the great sense of injustice which the colonists carried
into the revolution concerning the king's attempts to restrict trial in
the vicinage, it is not surprising that vicinage provisions were incor-
porated into many of the new state constitutions. Thus, although
seven of the first fifteen states omitted express references to venue or
vicinage, four required juries of "his" or "the" vicinage, vicinity or
country, two required trial where the crime was committed and two
in general terms expressed the importance of verifying facts where they
arose. 5 Blume, viewing these later constitutional provisions with
reference to the colonial statements, has concluded that "vicinage," as
used earlier by the colonists in their struggle with England, did not
refer specifically to the neighborhood of the crime or even to the county
in which the crime was alleged to have been committed but rather to
transportation either beyond the seas to England or to a distant colony.
"The writers of a great majority of the later constitutions, in copying
these early provisions, misunderstood them and made definite that
which purposely had been left indefinite." " Thus, he continues, "the
problem of the early constitution writers was to guard against the
dangers of transportation without taking from the legislatures power
to regulate venue within a state." "'
Considering the diversity of state provisions and procedures, it is
not surprising that the original Virginia Plan submitted to the Con-
stitutional Convention in 1787 made no effort to embody actual details
of criminal procedure.4 However, subsequent plans submitted to the
Convention attempted to deal specifically with the problem. The New
Jersey Plan, for instance, proposed "that no person shall be liable to
be tried for any criminal offense committed within any of the United
States, in any other state than that wherein the offense shall be com-
mitted . . . . " The essence of this suggestion, and similar sug-
gestions of Pinckney and Hamilton, was adopted by the Committee on
Detail and embodied in the draft constitution. It was amended slightly
1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 107 (1904).
45 Blume, The Place of Trial in Criminal Cases: Constitutioad Vicinage and
Veiue, 43 MIcH. L. REv. 59, 77 (1944) ; see HELLER 22-24.
46 Blume, supra note 45, at 78.
47 Ibid.
48 HELLER 24.
49 3 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL Co ENTIoN OF 1787, at 616 (rev.
ed. 1937).
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by the Committee of the Whole to provide for trial by jury for offenses
committed without the confines of any state. The provision was then
sent to the Committee on Style, which incorporated it into the judiciary
article."O
It is interesting that at no time during this process was the pro-
vision ever subjected to extensive debate in the Convention. In the
debates over ratification in the various states, however, the jury trial
clause was subjected to scathing attacks and denounced as inadequate.
The criticisms centered on three issues. First, opponents of the article
argued that, since the appellate courts would have the power to review
findings of both law and fact, the verdict of an impartial jury could be
set aside with impunity. Secondly, they decried the absence of a jury
trial provision for civil cases. "But the most vocal objections were
aimed at the lack of a narrowly drawn vicinage requirement and of an
explicit provision saving the right to challenge prospective jurors." 5'
Typical of the complaints being made was that of Abraham Holmes,
a delegate to the Massachusetts ratifying convention, that a defendant
would not only be deprived of a sympathetic local jury, but more im-
portantly "may by reason of the distance of his residence from the
place of the trial, be incapable of making such a defense as he is, in
justice, entitled to, and which he could avail himself of, if his trial was
in the same county where the crime is said to have been committed." 52
in Virginia, Patrick Henry asserted that, rather "than have it so
vaguely and equivocally provided for," he would have preferred to see
trial by jury left out altogether: " "Juries from the vicinage being not
secured, this right is in reality sacrificed." "' Grayson, agreeing with
Henry, stated:
where the governing power possesses an unlimited control
over the venue, no man's life is in safety. . . . The idea
which I call a true vicinage is, that a man shall be tried by
his neighbors. But the idea here is, that he may be tried in
any part of the state. . . . [Thus] they can hang anyone
they please, by having a jury to suit their purpose.r
5
In responding to these attacks, Madison had suggested that the
result of a narrowly drawn vicinage requirement would be to make
it impossible to summon a jury in the event of a rebellion in the whole
district.56  Additionally, Pendleton in Virginia " and Gore in Massa-
5o HELLER 25.
51 Ibid.
52 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 109-10 (1901) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOr].
53 3 ELLIOT 541.
543 ELLIOT 545.
55 3 ELLIOT 568-69.
56 3 ELIOT 537.
57 3 ELLIOT 546.
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chusetts " indicated that, since jurors were to be impartial weighers of
evidence presented in court, knowledge of the neighborhood was no
longer essential. But the article was primarily defended simply on
grounds that a more detailed provision could not be drawn in view of
the great diversity of state practices.59
After ratification when the first Congress was convened, Madison
took the lead in attempting to secure passage of a Bill of Rights and
drafted the original proposals for the first amendments. In an attempt
to meet the criticisms which had been made of the generality of the
jury trial provision in article III, he submitted two propositions to
Congress. The first enumerated a series of safeguards for the accused
which critics wanted to see in black and white but which made no
reference to the jury. The second was intended to elaborate upon and
ultimately replace the vague language of article III as follows:
That . . . the third clause be struck out, and in its place be
inserted the clauses following, to wit:
The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments,
and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or the militia
when on actual service, in time of war or public danger) shall
be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage . .
provided that in cases of crimes committed within any county
which may be in the possession of an enemy, or in which a
general insurrection may prevail, the trial may by law be
authorized in some other county, of the same state, as near
as may be to the seat of the offense.60
Madison's proposed amendments met with some opposition in the
House of Representatives. An attempt by Burke of South Carolina to
replace the word "vicinage" by "district or county within which the
offense was committed" was apparently voted down. But a proposal
by Livermore to allow trial in the state where the offense was com-
mitted was passed. After some further minor changes in committee,
the proposed amendment went to the Senate. Little is known of the
action of the Senate on the jury trial provision; but that the Senate
was unwilling to agree to the House version is clear from the following
letter from Madison to Edmund Pendleton, discussing the variety of
state vicinage provisions:
[The Senate] sent back the plan of amendments with some
alterations which strike in my opinion at the most salutary
articles. In many of the States juries, even in criminal cases,
582 ELLIOT 112.
59 HELLm 27.
60 Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guar-
anty of Triai by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 972 (1926). See generally DUMBAULD,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MFANS TODAY 33-44 (1957).
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are taken from the State at large; in others, from districts of
considerable extent; in a very few from the county alone ...
The difficulty of uniting the minds of men accustomed to
think and act differently can only be conceived by those who
have witnessed it.6
The proposed amendment was then submitted to a conference com-
mittee, and again a letter from Madison to Pendleton is our sole
source of information on the negotiations. 2 Madison wrote regarding
the Senate members of the committee:
They are equally inflexible in opposing a definition of the
locality of Juries. The vicinage they contend is either too
vague or too strict a term, too vague if depending on limits
to be fixed by the pleasure of the law, too strict if limited to
the County. It was proposed to insert after the word Juries
"with the accustomed requisites," leaving the definition to be
construed according to the judgment of professional men.
Even this could not be obtained. The truth is that in most
of the States the practice is different and hence the irrecon-
cilable difference of ideas on the subject. . . . The Senate
suppose also that the provision for vicinage in the Judiciary
Bill, will sufficiently quiet the fears which called for an amend-
ment on this point.'
The absence of complete information as to the Senate proceedings
on the sixth amendment makes it impossible to trace the exact develop-
ment of the vicinage clause, or to ascertain with any certainty the
author of specific words." Clearly, Madison's proposed substitute for
article III met with strong objections in the Senate. It appears that
the House version was subsequently adopted as part of a compromise
by which the House withdrew objection to all but one other change
made by the Senate ' and only after the Conference Committee failed
to reach an agreement on any alternative formulation. Where, when
and by whom the proviso for an impartial jury of the State and
district "wherein the crime shall have been committed," was added
cannot be ascertained from the available records. The original
Madison proposal, explicitly requiring a jury of the vicinage, clearly
had its origins in the Virginia Bill of Rights. Thus, one article in
summing up the actions of the Convention has speculated that Madison
615 MADISON, THE WRrrINGS OF JAMEs MADISON 420-21 (Hunt ed. 1910).
62 HEIIL.R 32.
635 MADsoN, op. cit. mipra note 61, at 424. (Emphasis in original.)
4HELLER 33.
e5 Id. at 32-33; see DUMBAULD, op. cit. supra note 60, at 48-49.
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transferred the phrase emphasizing the local character of the
jury as found in his Virginia model to that article of the
original Constitution which dealt with the jury problem.
And Congress, pursuing with the local jury clause, as with
all others, a policy of preserving unaltered the form of the
original Constitution, transferred it back into the familiar
clause of the Bill of Rights from whence it came, and then
adopted the Sixth Amendment, in its final form, as adequately
and familiarly expressive of the current conceptions of trial
by jury."°
Heller has suggested that, in many of the early debates over
jury trial, those who sought more narrowly defined vicinage require-
ments were in reality speaking in terms of venue, or at least may have
failed to distinguish clearly the difference between the two concepts.
But, as Heller himself has pointed out:
[I]f there is evidence to support this assertion, that the issue
of vicinage has been confused by the use made of the term in
Revolutionary and pre-Revolutionary days, the difficulties
created by such loose usage were merely additional to the
very evident disparity of opinion with reference to the proper
area of vicinage.67
Thus, while there may have been some confusion over terminology,
the basic issues involved in the dispute and the dangers the framers
sought to guard against were clearly perceived. It must not be for-
gotten that the sixth amendment was adopted in the wake of a recent
history of forced deportations to distant places for trial. In the colonial
period the trial by a local jury was emotionally and outspokenly de-
fended as a right bestowed by Magna Charta and as a free man's best
protection against despotic government and the economic and physical
hardship occasioned by trial far from home. Early provisions which
required trial where the crime was committed would also, in an age
of restricted travel and mobility, in effect decree trial at the defendant's
home, or, if not at his home, at least where the defendant was physically
present at the time the crime was committed. In any event, while the
amendment as finally adopted must have still been too broadly worded
to please many opponents of the original provision in article III, there
can be no question that it considerably narrowed the place of trials
more than proponents of a strong federal judiciary would have desired.
The wording of the amendment represented a compromise
between the localist tendencies of those who wished to re-
66Frankfuter & Corcoran, supra note 60, at 975.
67 HE= 93.
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strict vicinage to the county and the Federalists who urged a
minimum of restraint on the exercise of the judicial power of
the national government. By tying the concept of vicinage to
a system of judicial districts subject to Congressional deter-
mination, the First Congress passed the problem to its suc-
cessors and left unsolved the conflicts of opinions which had
divided its members. 8
The outcry which resulted after adoption of the vague article I
provision reflected the genuine concern of the time with protections for
criminal defendants, and the compromise embodied in the amendment
in response to that criticism must be seen as a rejection of the idea
of nationwide criminal venue. That such nationwide venue would
have facilitated the administration of criminal justice was probably as
true in Revolutionary days as it is today. Thus,
It is doubtful whether the concern which led to the in-
clusion of two provisions regarding venue could have been
to facilitate the prosecution of crime, by fixing trial in a place
convenient for the government's witnesses. It is more likely
that the framers were influenced by what Justice Frankfurter
called "the unfairness and hardship to which trial in an
environment alien to the accused exposes him." 89
As Professor Moore points out,70 since the framers could not have
contemplated a society with the mobility and complexity of ours and
the almost infinite variety of acts which have become criminal offenses,
neither could they have contemplated the possibility of a defendant
''committing" a crime in a place thousands of miles away from the
place where the defendant was physically to be found at the time he
acted. They could not have realized, therefore, that by tying the
place of trial to the place where the crime was committed, they were
providing Congress with a convenient foundation on which it could
erect that very structure of nationwide criminal venue which they had
explicitly rejected in their compromise.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTI-VENUE CONCEPT
Lack of sensitivity to the competing values and problems which
the constitutional framers faced in working out their compromise be-
tween protection of individual rights and efficient administration of
justice has led later lawmakers, engaged in the process of adjusting
these provigions to their own- contemporary problems, to too narrow
an interptetation of whatthe Constitution requires as adequate pro-
68 Ibid.
6 8 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 18-9 (2d ed. Cipes 1966).
70 Ibid.
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tection of criminal defendants. This can be seen as early as 1867 when
the concept of a single offense which could serve as the basis for venue
either where begun or where completed was already clearly recognized
and enacted into statutory form.
7 1
The broadening effect on venue of such a statute can be seen in
Hyde v. United States,72 one of the earliest cases in which the Supreme
Court attempted to define the permissible outer limits of venue. Hyde,
a resident of San Francisco, had been arrested in California and with
three other defendants had been indicted in Washington, D. C., for
conspiring to defraud the United States out of public land located in
Oregon and California. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
upheld the laying of venue in Washington on grounds that, since overt
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy had been performed in Washington,
the conspiracy itself had been "committed" in Washington. The result
of the decision was to subject Hyde to trial in the District of Columbia,
3000 miles from his home, in a place where he personally had never
been present in aid of the conspiracy (although Hyde's co-conspirators
had participated in government proceedings in the District) and in
spite of the fact that the overt acts allegedly committed in Washington
were a relatively small part of the entire scheme. Indeed, the Court
acknowledged the likelihood of hardship but pointed out that the neces-
sity of efficient criminal law administration required that outcome.
Certainly, by rejecting the argument of Mr. Justice Holmes for the
dissent that conspiracy prosecutions should be brought "where the
conspiracy exists in fact," 7' the majority greatly enlarged the multi-
venue possibilities inherent in conspiracy prosecutions.
One of the earliest decisions in which the continuing offense concept
generally, and the problem of intervening district venue in particular,
was faced by the Supreme Court and held constitutional was Armour
Packing Co. v. United States,74 in which a shipper was indicted in
Missouri (an intervening district adjacent to the district in which the
shipment had originated) for violating the Elkins Act 7 by securing
transportation of goods in interstate commerce at below the carrier's
published rate. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
special venue provision providing that venue could be laid in any inter-
vening district "through which the transportation may have been con-
ducted." Construing the constitutional provisions as merely requiring
trial in the locality of the offense and nlot as requiring the physical pres-
ence of the defendant, the Court agreed that its construction could, in
any particular case, work serious hardship by permitting prosecution in
a place remote from the home and vicinage of the accused. This, how-
71 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14 Stat. 484.
72225 U.S. 347 (1912).
73 Id. at 390 (dissenting opinion). -
74 209 U.S. 5.6.(1908)..
7532 Stat. 847"(1903), 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43"(1964).'
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ever, was said to be an objection to the policy of the law but not to
the power of Congress to pass it. Viewing the situation as arising
from the development of modem transportation facilities, the Court
stated that "considerations of convenience and hardship, while they may
appeal to the legislative branch of the Government, will not prevent
Congress from exercising its constitutional power in the management
and control of interstate commerce." "I The Court, looking at the
nature of the offense involved, held:
Wherever such transporation is received, there the offense is
to be deemed to have been committed. Why may this not be
so? In this feature of the statute, the transportation being of
the essence of the offense, when it takes place, whether in one
district or another, whether at the beginning, at the end, or
in the middle of the journey, it is equally and at all times
committed. 77
The Court, by upholding the constitutionality of intervening district
venue, made it possible for prosecutions to be brought where not even
the "constructive" presence of the defendant could be argued to have
been a proper basis for venue (as had been argued in the conspiracy
cases).
The implications of the Armour and Hyde decisions for federal
criminal venue are profound. In conspiracy prosecutions the choice of
venue made available to the prosecution becomes almost unlimited.
For example, since no distinction is made as to the importance of the
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, minimal acts, equivocal and
remote in themselves, may still provide a sufficient basis for venue,"8
and the defendant may be deemed constructively present in districts
into which he, and perhaps even his co-conspirators, have never
physically intruded. Even outside the conspiracy area, under con-
tinuing offense statutes, intervening district prosecutions may be
brought in areas having no particular interest in or connection with
the offense in question simply by virtue of the fortuitous routing of a
train or truck which could not be foreseen or controlled by the de-
fendant. Certainly the courts have been aware of these implications
and have often appeared uncomfortable in upholding the propriety of
these venue provisions, avoiding their application if at all possible.
In United States v. Johnson,79 the defendant had allegedly violated
the Federal Denture Act so by mailing dentures from Chicago to Dela-
ware where he was not licensed. The district court quashed the indict-
16 209 U.S. at 77.
77Id. at 74.
1s See cases collected in Abrams 765-66.
7 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
so Federal Denture Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 1087, 18 U.S.C. § 1821 (1964).
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ment in Delaware, holding that prosecution was proper only in the
place where the dentures were deposited in the mail. The Government
appealed, arguing that an indictment could be brought in any place
through which the dentures passed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for the majority and citing Armour as precedent, reiterated that
"Congress may constitutionally make the practices which led to the
Federal Denture Act triable in any federal district through which an
offending denture is transported." " The Court, however, would not
authorize such discretion in choice of venue in the absence of a clear
congressional mandate for a special venue provision similar to that
enforced in Armour. The Court then construed the act as allowing
prosecution only at the place of deposit and found the absence of an
Armour-type provision not to be congressional oversight but to be
far more rationally explained by differences between the two acts. The
venue provision of the Elkins Act, the Court held, underlined the
offense defined by that act, which was not the illegal sending or bring-
ing of goods but rather their transportation in interstate commerce.
"That transportation is inescapably a process, a continuing phenom-
enon." 82 The "bringing" or "sending" prohibited by the Denture Act,
on the other hand, the Court viewed as a completed act rather than as
a process. While pointing out that such a restrictive construction of
the statutory language was not required by article III or the sixth
amendment, the Court found it to be "more consonant with the con-
siderations of historic experience and policy which underlie those
safeguards in the Constitution regarding the trial of crimes." ' Mr.
Justice Frankfurter further stated:
By utilizing the doctrine of a continuing offense, Congress
may, to be sure, provide that the locality of a crime shall
extend over the whole area through which force propelled by
an offender operates. . . . Plainly enough, such leeway not
only opens the door to needless hardship to an accused by
prosecution remote from home and from appropriate facili-
ties for defense. It also leads to the appearance of abuses,
if not to abuses, in the selection of what may be deemed a
tribunal favorable to the prosecution. 4
The distaste which the majority of the Johnson Court evidently
felt for the continuing offense concept manifested itself in a finding
that the language of the statute in question was ambiguous. This
ambiguity the majority resolved in accord with what it felt to be the
81323 U.S. at 274.
82 Id. at 277.
83 Id. at 275.
84 Ibid.
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underlying spirit rather than letter of the constitutional provisions for
venue-i.e., the necessity to protect the opportunity for trial in the
vicinage of the defendant wherever possible. The constitutional "pur-
poses" as the majority conceived them were, however, not perceived
to be sufficiently strong to override congressional intent. Rather, the
appeal to the constitutional policy would, as enunciated, only come into
play as a tool of statutory interpretation upon a prior finding by the
Court that the statute was unclear. That the Court was straining to
find ambiguity in this particular statute is evident from the fact that
four of the Justices were unable to discern any ambiguity in the statu-
tory language and rejected in toto the majority's view that restriction
of venue to the place of mailing was more consonant with the under-
lying spirit of the constitutional provisions. Thus Mr. Justice Reed's
dissent (in which Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Justices Douglas and
Rutledge joined) voiced his belief that the Court had misunderstood
the purpose of the constitutional provisions: "We understand them to
assure a trial in the place where the crime is committed and not to be
concerned with the domicile of the criminal nor with his familiarity
with the environment of the place of trial." "
Perhaps the majority's reluctance to engrain its enunciated view
of constitutional policy upon the law of criminal venue as a constitu-
tional imperative can be explained by a feeling on the part of the Court
that the requisite ambiguity could somehow be found in any case in
which justice would require a restrictive view of venue possibilities.
In 1948, however, Congress responded to the Johnson decision by
incorporating the idea of a continuing offense directly into the first
paragraph of section 3237, the general venue statute, and by adding
a second paragraph in which offenses involving use of the mails or
transportation in interstate commerce were expressly made continuing
offenses."" Thus the Reviser's Note to section 3237 states that the
section was completely rewritten to clarify legislative intent and that
the second paragraph of the revised section was expressly added to
meet the situation created by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Johnson: "The revised section removes all doubt as to the venue of
continuing offenses and makes unnecessary special venue provisions
except in cases where Congress desires to restrict the prosecution of
offenses to particular districts .... 87
85 Id. at 280-81.
86 See pp. 401-02 supra, where the text of the statute is set out.
8 7 Revisers Notes following 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1964).
In the committee hearings and in the floor debates, it was pointed out that
the bill involved a "revision" and not a mere "codification" of existing law,
and the Reviser's notes were referred to as explaining the changes. But there
was no discussion of the merits of § 3237 or of other comparable changes.
Do drafting experts perform their duty to Congress, and does Congress
perform its duty to the country, by dealing in this cavalier fashion with prob-
lems of such magnitude?
HART & WECSLER, THE FEnm COURTS AND TE FmERAL SYsTxm 1105 (1953).
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. Even in the face of this explicit statement of congressional intent,
however, the continuing offense statute was still vulnerable to re-
strictive judicial interpretation. In essence, the effect in some cases
of the enactment of the revision to section 3237 was only to remove
the old problem of statutory construction one step. Thus in 1953 in
United States v. Ross,8 the Tenth Circuit held that "deposit" of
obscene mail as prohibited by the obscenity statutes was not a con-
tinuing "use" of the mails within the meaning of section 3237. Ac-
cordingly, the court found that an indictment brought in Kansas, re-
sulting from the mailing of obscene matter from California to Kansas,
was not proper. The offense was construed as being complete when
the material was deposited in the mailbox, and it was not deemed
essential to the offense that the material actually be carried in the
mails.' Congress once more responded to a restrictive judicial inter-
pretation of the continuing offense statute with a new legislative
enactment. In 1958 the obscenity statutes were amended to prohibit
"use" of the mails,90 thus making the mailing of obscenity inescapably
a continuing offense by bringing it under the provisions of the second
paragraph of section 3237.
The Supreme Court has continued to manifest its discomfort with
the multi-venue and continuing offense concept in a variety of cases,
and conflicting interpretations of both constitutional and statutory
venue provisions have marked the cases decided by the Court since
Johnson.
In United States v. Anderson,9 a selectee had been ordered by his
draft board in the Eastern District of the State of Washington to
report for induction at Fort Lewis in the Western District of the State.
The selectee reported but refused to take the oath unless a vaccination
requirement was waived. The Supreme Court held proper venue had
been laid where the selectee had refused to submit to induction and not
where the order had been issued by the local draft board. In setting
down a much-quoted rule, the Court said that where Congress does not
specify the place the crime was committed, "the locus delicti must be
determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of
the act or acts constituting it." 9 Thus, where the crime alleged is
8 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953).
89 The court pointed out:
The second paragraph of § 3237 must be read in the light of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . . We think there is a
clear distinction between a deposit for mailing or delivery and the use of the
mails. The use of the mails continues from the point of deposit to the point
of delivery.. Crimes involving the use of the mails are therefore continuing
crimes, but the unlawful act defined in § 1461 is the deposit for mailing . . ..
205 F.2d at 621.
90 See note 17 supra, where the text of the statutes, as amended, is set out.
91328 U.S.'699 (1946).
02Id. at 703.
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the failure to perform a legally required act, there is only one possible
venue--the crime is committed at the place fixed for performance of
the act. In Anderson, such a rule presented no great difficulties because
venue was laid at Fort Lewis where the selectee was physically present.
In Johnston v. United States,"3 however, which presented a factual
situation similar to that in Anderson except that the defendants had
never reported to the specified place, application of the rule resulted in
the defendants being removed great distances from their homes to the
place of trial. In Johnston, Mr. Justice Reed, this time writing for
the majority (Mr. Justice Douglas being joined by Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Mr. Justice Black in dissent), averred that "the possi-
bility that registrants might be ordered to report to points remote
from the situs of draft boards neither allows nor requires judicial
changes in the law of venue. . . . [P]ublic policy . . . fixes the
situs of the trial in the vicinage of the crime rather than the residence
of the accused." 14 This extension of the Anderson rationale to a
situation where "no act of any kind was committed in the distant
district" " was at best questionable, particularly since the Anderson
decision had deliberately left open the question whether a different
result might have been reached "if appellee had never left Spokane or
reported at Fort Lewis." 96
In United States v. Cores, 1 an alien seaman had remained in the
United States over the time allowed by his conditional landing permit,
thus violating the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 The defendant
had entered the United States in Philadelphia and had been appre-
hended and indicted in Connecticut. The permit had expired, however,
before the defendant had ever reached Connecticut. In interpreting
the special venue provision, Mr. Justice Clark for the majority (Mr.
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas once more dis-
sented, on the ground that the offense was not a continuing one)
pointed out that "the provision for trial in the vicinity of the crime
is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an
accused is prosecuted in a remote place. Provided its language permits,
the act in question should be given that construction which will respect
such considerations." 9 The Court then construed the word "remains"
in the statute to mean a continuing presence and held that the act had
made the offense a continuing one. Certainly as to its effect on this
938 351 U.S. 215 (1956).
% Id. at 220-21.
95 Id. at 223. The dissenters appear to have tried to bring this offense within
the Johnson approach. Thus, they argued that there was room for doubt as to where
the crime was committed and such doubts should be resolved in favor of trial at the
defendants' residence in the light of underlying constitutional policy.
96 328 U.S. at 706.
97356 U.S. 405 (1958).
98 Section 252(c), 66 Stat. 220 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1282(c) (1964).
99 356 U.S. at 407.
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particular defendant the result was just, since it meant that he would
be tried in Connecticut where he had been apprehended. The Court,
indeed, pointed to this as one reason for its holding and also to the
fact that by considering the offense a continuing one it made it possible
for the defendant in such a case to avail himself of the benefits of
Rule 21 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows
change of venue upon motion of the defendant in some circumstances.'
Finally, the Court warned that a contrary ruling would severely limit
the effectiveness of the statute, since in other cases the Government
might be faced with an insurmountable problem of proving where the
defendant was at the time his permit ran out.
Travis v. United States 'o' presented the unusual situation of a
criminal defendant arguing for the right to be tried in a distant court.
The defendant, a labor union leader, was prosecuted in Colorado for
allegedly mailing from Colorado to Washington, D. C. a false non-
communist affidavit required by the Labor Management Relations
Act.3 2 The Government claimed that since the illegal act had been
begun in Colorado and completed in Washington it could be prosecuted
in either place. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing this time for a majority
of the Supreme Court, held that venue was proper only in Washington.
The Court found that filing of the affidavit was not required but rather
was merely a condition precedent to the use by the union of certain
National Labor Relations Board procedures of which it could avail
itself or not as it chose. Had the filing been a required act, "the whole
process of filing, including the use of the mails, might logically be con-
strued to constitute the offense." 103 Since it was not required, the
offense was not committed until the actual filing. Mr. Justice Harlan
for the dissent (joined by Justices Frankfurter and Clark) argued
that "in this kind of case, prosecution in the district in which the
affidavit was executed, most often I would suppose the place where
the union offices are located, is more likely to respect the basic policy
of the Sixth Amendment." 104 Certainly the majority gave insufficient
100 FED R. CRm. P. 21(b):
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the
court upon motion of the defendant may transfer the proceeding as to him
or any one or more of the counts thereof to another district.
At the time of the Cores case, the predecessor of this rule limited change of venue,
for reasons other than prejudice in the district, to those cases where venue existed
in more than one district. Advisory Committee Note following FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b).
The operation and impact of this rule with respect to prosecutions for the mailing
of obscenity are discussed in section III of this Comment.
101364 U.S. 631 (1961).
102 This prosecution was brought under the so-called "false statement statute,"
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964), which was specifically made applicable to the type of affidavit
here in question by § 9(h) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 61 Stat. 146
(1947). This section was later repealed by §201(d) of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 73 Stat 525.
103 364 U.S. at 635.
10
4 Id. at 640 (dissenting opinion).
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attention to the problem that, although the decision was advantageous
to this particular defendant, the likelihood was created that in future
prosecutions defendants would be tried in places distant from where
they had acted. In any event, the decision may represent an inter-
pretation more restrictive than earlier cases as to what types of offenses
may be subsumed under the first paragraph of section 3237(a).111
Under this interpretation, where acts are merely preparatory to an
offense which may be described as involving a single act element only,
the location of which is specified by statute, such preparatory acts will
probably not be deemed sufficient to bring the offense under the first
paragraph of section 3237(a). Thus any tendency in the lower federal
courts to find such preparatory acts to be a sufficient basis for multi-
venue may be inhibited."0 6
Whatever may be the implications of the Travis case for the
future, the general tendency of the federal courts to view the consti-
tutional venue provisions as tools of interpretation to be called into
play only when Congress is silent or ambiguous in its definition of
the place of a crime is likely to continue. Since the Constitution re-
quires only that trial be held at the place where the crime is com-
mitted, Congress can, without transgressing these constitutional limits,
declare the locus delicti to be almost anywhere having even the most
minimal contacts with the crime. Provided that the voice of Congress
is loud and clear, the courts need not inquire further as to the justi-
fication for the venue selected. Any resulting hardship to the de-
fendant goes merely to the wisdom of the legislative policy and not
to its constitutionality.
The present judicial tolerance for less restrictive venue provisions
may be influenced in part by the fact that defendants have recourse to
a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 (b) for change
of venue "in the interest of justice." In general, however, the major
impetus behind the growing acceptance of such broad venue choice
would appear to be the feeling that such provisions are necessary for
the efficient administration of justice. Thus they provide a means of
relieving overcrowded dockets in some districts by draining off the
judicial business to other districts where government prosecutors and
courts are less burdened. More important, they are seen as a way of
reaching new interstate crimes which otherwise might be difficult to
prosecute in the face of archaic procedural rules or constitutional
limitations on state jurisdiction. To this extent, the trend to more
liberal venue provisions may be viewed as a corollary of the more
general trend toward extending federal criminal jurisdiction into areas
of misconduct formerly deemed to be state concerns. These con-
105 Abrams 786. This case has been strongly criticized. The Supreme Court
1960 Term, 75 HAIv. L. Ray. 40, 190 (1961).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Gross, 276 F.2d 816 (2d Cir.), cert. dinied, 363
U.S. 831 (1960).
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siderations are further reinforced by a reluctance on the part of many
courts to allow prosecutions to fail and the guilty to go free merely
because of technical errors in the choice of forum.
Because of these substantial factors, the continuing offense concept
has become securely engrained in the administration of federal criminal
law and the constitutionality of the concept itself, as opposed to its
application in a particular area of criminal law, would appear to
be no longer open to attack. Unfortunately, however, as may be seen
from the foregoing discussion of some recent cases, overly broad court
interpretations as to where a crime is committed tend to increase
greatly the erratic and arbitrary character of venue in many federal
prosecutions. Nor does such encouragement of verbal games truly
implement the spirit of the Constitution which its adherents claim to
be serving. To a great extent these adverse effects could be avoided
were the courts and Congress to reserve use of the continuing offense
concept for exceptional situations and were they to employ more limited
interpretations of where a crime is actually committed, construing this
to be-if at all possible-where a defendant was physically present and
acting at the time of the offense. To date neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has shown any such inclination to limit the impact of the
continuing offense concept. Rather:
It appears that Congress, by its definition of the elements
of offenses, by its formulation of the general venue provision,
and by enactment of specific venue provisions attached to
particular offenses exercises an almost plenary power over
venue. The constitutional venue requirement only fixes some
undefined outer limits.
10 7
III. OBSCENITY AND MULTI-VENUE
In the preceding section of the Comment it has been shown that
the impact of the constitutional provisions has been merely to require
that a particular approach, based upon the nature of an offense and
of the act or acts constituting it, be used in resolving any issue of
venue. The task of the court is to apply this approach in accord with
what is perceived to be the underlying constitutional policy; but the
court may do so only in those cases where Congress has left the matter
in doubt. By using the crime committed formula as an excuse for
permitting Congress to define broadly where a crime is committed,
the courts have enabled Congress to establish almost nationwide venue
for certain offenses, with resultant hardship to defendants who must
stand trial far from home. In the area of obscenity prosecutions this
hardship is compounded by the vagaries of the law of obscenity itself,
which make choice of venue a peculiarly sensitive and critical problem
107 Abrams 816.
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for the defendant. In obscenity prosecutions, as in few others, change
of venue probably will result in change of verdict.
The constitutionality of the exercise of congressional discretion in
excluding objectionable material from the United States mails is well
established as part of the larger power vested in Congress to establish
post offices and to regulate the entire postal system of the nation.1 8
That obscenity itself is not constitutionally protected by the first amend-
ment is by now equally certain. 9  The problem was first squarely
faced by the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States."0 After ex-
amining colonial constitutions and statutes making libel and obscenity
illegal, Mr. justice Brennan for the Court stated that
all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance
. . .have the full protection of the guaranties, unless exclud-
able because they encroach upon the limited area of more im-
portant interests. But implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance."'
The decision then set forth a standard of obscenity which the Court
felt would be constitutionally justifiable and which has formed the
basis of all other standards since the decision:
whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test,
judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the
most susceptible persons, might well encompass material
legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as
unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedom of speech and
press." 2
The Court agreed with the defendants that the terms of section 1461
of the obscenity statute were vague, but stated that "this Court .
has consistently held that lack of precision is not itself offensive to the
requirements of due process. . . . [A]l1 that is required is that the
language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices
, ,, 118
10 8 See Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904) ; Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727 (1878).
109 See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) ; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
110 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
M Id. at 484.
112 Id. at 489. (Emphasis added.)
113Id. at 491, quoting from United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
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It was clear even as the decision was handed down that the pro-
posed test raised serious problems as to whose standards were to be
applied in judging a particular work. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in
concurring, pointed out that "present laws depend largely upon the
effect that the materials may have upon those who receive them. It is
manifest that the same object may have a different impact, varying
according to the part of the community it reached." 114 Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting, focused on the problem of differing standards from
state to state, finding them to be a source of strength rather than
confusion. He saw the real disadvantage inherent in the majority
decision to be the "danger of a deadening uniformity which can result
from nation-wide federal censorship, and in view of the fact that the
constitutionality of this conviction must be weighed against the First
and not the Fourteenth Amendment." "' But the majority opinion
gave the courts no guidance as to what the "community" was whose
"community standards" were to be applied in determining whether
particular material was obscene.116  As late as 1960 Lockhart and
McClure were asking:
Is it a community bounded by geographical limits or a com-
munity formed along cultural lines? If a geographical com-
munity, is it the local community in which the censorship of
material for obscenity takes place? And if local, how local-
a particular state, or urban, or rural area? Or is it the
national community or even the larger international com-
munity called the western world? And if it is the com-
munity's contemporary standards that are to be applied, what
is to be done with materials like Jonathan Swift's poems to
Celia-accepted and widely read in the past-that are likely to
be a bit too raw for the contemporary standards of some
communities however defined. 117
Some federal district courts emphatically claimed the right of jurors
in their districts to apply their own local standards as they saw fit,"'
writing off the heavy burden cast upon publishers and distributors of
having to know every local standard of an entire nation as one of the
hazards of their business.
114 354 U.S. at 495 (concurring opinion).
11r Id. at 506-07 (dissenting opinion).
116 The reference to community standards in Roth was not original with that case.
Its source is usually attributed to Judge Learned Hand, who, in dictum, said "should
not the word 'obscene' be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compro-
mise between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and
now?" United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
1t7 Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 49-50 (1960).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Frew, 187 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Mich. 1960), in
which the court denied collateral estoppel effect to earlier district court proceedings
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In 1962, however, the Roth standard was further amplified by
the opinion in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day," where the Court was
faced with the problem of an alleged violation of section 1461 by the
mailing of magazines intended to appeal to homosexuals. Mr. Justice
Harlan, announcing the judgment of the Court in an opinion in which
only Mr. Justice Stewart concurred,' after finding the magazines to
be lacking in patent offensiveness, went on to discuss the problem of
community standards:
There must first be decided the relevant "community" in
terms of whose standards of decency the issue must be judged.
We think that the proper test under this federal statute,
reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose
population reflects many different ethnic and cultural back-
grounds, is a national standard of decency. We need not
decide whether Congress could constitutionally prescribe a
lesser geographical framework for judging this issue which
would not have the intolerable consequence of denying some
sections of the country access to material, there deemed
acceptable, which in others might be considered offensive to
prevailing community standards of decency.' 2
The problem of the constitutional necessity for a national standard
of obscenity received its most extensive consideration in Jacobellis v.
Ohio,m2 where the Court was faced with a violation of a state statute by
exhibition of an allegedly obscene movie. Mr. Justice Brennan, an-
nouncing the judgment of the Court, reiterated the view that Roth
required a national standard. Admitting that local communities in the
nation were diverse and might vary in their tolerance of "obscenity,"
the opinion pointed out that the Court would not sanction a constitu-
tional standard which varied with state, county or town lines:
in Los Angeles in which ostensibly the same materials as those forming the basis of
the Michigan prosecution were found to be not obscene. The court pointed out that
what the community of Los Angeles may have found not obscene may meet
a different standard in Michigan. . . . If by using the Los Angeles proceedings
as an irrevocable license and imprimatur, without limit as to time or place,
these defendants can send their merchandise wherever they please, then indeed
are they the ones who will set the standard for every community they choose
as their market.
Id. at 506. But see Flying Eagle Publications v. United States, 273 F.2d 799, 803
(1st Cir. 1960), in which the court pointed out that
while we may assume that a jury would accurately reflect the contemporary
standards of the particular community from which it was drawn, we are
dealing here with a federal statute having national scope and no doubt com-
munity standards differ rather widely over the country at large.
119 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
12 0 There was no majority opinion in Manual. Mr. Justice Black concurred in
the result. A separate concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan was joined in by
the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas. Mr. Justice Clark was the sole dissenter.
Two Justices, Frankfurter and White, did not participate.
121 370U.S. at 488.
122 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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[T]o sustain the suppression of a particular book or film in
one locality would deter its dissemination in other localities
where it might be held not obscene, since sellers and exhibitors
would be reluctant to risk criminal conviction in testing the
variation between the two places. It would be a hardy person
who would sell a book or exhibit a film anywhere in the
land after this Court had sustained the judgment of one
"community" holding it to be outside the constitutional
protection.123
As in Manual, however, the opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court in Jacobellis was not a majority opinion, and it was joined
only by Mr. Justice Goldberg. The remainder of the Court, except for
Mr. Justice White, who merely concurred in the judgment, set out
the divergent lines of reasoning which were to mark future Supreme
Court obscenity decisions. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in
the result, but on grounds that under the first amendment all censorship
of obscenity is prohibited.' Mr. Justice Stewart propounded the
view that only hard core pornography, which he could not define, was
without constitutional protection, and, finding the film not to be "hard
core," concurred in the result." 5 It is interesting that, although the
Brennan opinion cited with approval the Harlan opinion in Manual,
Mr. Justice Harlan was among the dissenters in Jacobellis on the
ground that the states are constitutionally permitted a wider latitude
in determining what is obscene than is the federal government.
6
Finally, the dissent of the Chief Justice joined in by Mr. Justice Clark
rejected in toto any constitutional necessity for a national standard,
alleging that "there is no provable 'national standard' and perhaps
there should be none. .-. . This Court has not been able to enunciate
one, and it would be unreasonable to expect local courts to divine
one." 127 Thus, although Jacobellis has become known as the case
which established the constitutional necessity for a national standard,
this requirement received the support of but two of the Justices, who
in future cases would likely be joined by Mr. Justice Harlan only in
cases involving federal as opposed to state censorship.
In any event, the gist of the Jacobellis requirement seems to be
that the local jury, faced with a particular piece of alleged obscenity,
is expected to transcend its own local prejudices and standards and, by
some vague alchemy, arrive at a so-called national standard. If the
jury can anticipate that the material might be acceptable under a
"national standard," the jury is to find the material not obscene, no
'w Id. at 194.
'2A Id. at 196 (concurring opinion).
m25 Id. at 197 (concurring opinion).
1 Id. at 203 (dissenting opinion).
in7 Id. at 200 (dissenting opinion).
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matter how patently offensive it might be considered in the community
where the jury is sitting. Certainly such an approach requires an
almost super-human objectivity on the part of an individual juror.'
Granting the dubious legal proposition that the standard of ob-
scenity to be applied must be national, and the even more dubious
psychological proposition that juries with proper guidance will be able
to rise above their own community prejudices, can we then assume the
existence in fact of a uniform national standard which the judge and
jury can apply? In view of the great diversity of ethnic and religious
viewpoints in America and the present flux and uncertainties regarding
mores and social values, the existence of any identifiable national
standard would seem to be highly unlikely. The Supreme Court has
never directly ruled on the issue of whether evidence of the community
standard is required, although Justices Frankfurter (in a concurring
opinion) and Harlan (concurring in part and dissenting in part) have
suggested that exclusion of such evidence at trial would constitute
denial of due process.' Some courts have required proof by the
government that the challenged material actually appealed to the
prurient interest of the average man. In United States v. Klaw,
3 0 the
Second Circuit pointed out that "the enlarged judicial function in this
area requires that we consider the proof or lack thereof and the manner
in which the case was placed before the jury, not just whether the
material could possibly be brought within the range of the so-called
'obscenity' statute." 131 After finding that the jury had been given
no evidence on which to judge the material's prurient appeal, the court
remarked that "too easily the jury could aid suppression simply on the
basis of speculations and suspicions about the prurient appeal of
material to some unknown, undefined person whose psyche is not
known. With the First Amendment in the background, this cannot be
abided." 132 In the absence of sufficient proof of obscenity, "it would
be altogether too easy for any prosecutor to stand before a jury, display
the exhibits involved and merely ask in summation: 'Would you want
your son or daughter to see or read this stuff ?' A conviction in every
instance would be virtually assured." 13 Yet, in another obscenity
case,8 4 the same year and in the very same court, where all facts had
128 This problem is somewhat alleviated by the enlarged judicial function in the
area of obscenity. As indicated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Jacobellis, "since it is
only 'obscenity' that is excluded from the constitutional protection, the question
whether a particular work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue of constitutional
law" and independent review of the facts of each case is essential. Id. at 188.
19 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65, 171 (1959). See also Comment,
76 H.Rv. L. REv. 1498 (1963).
130 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
13, Id. at 160.
132 Id. at 167.
133 Id. at 170.




been stipulated except whether the material itself was obscene, the
majority held that the defendant had also stipulated away the require-
ment that the government introduce evidence of appeal to prurient
interest. Judge Waterman, in dissent, pointed out that the analogy
of the jury's function in these cases to that of a jury in a negligence case
was fairly persuasive as long as the jury's decision that certain
material was obscene could be viewed as the legal expression
of revulsion against the material by the community from
which the jury was drawn . . . . But we now know the
standard is national, not local. . . . I am not persuaded
that, without some evidence other than the records and labels
and each juror's own personal reaction thereto, a jury can
appraise such material. ... 3r'
Where courts realize that a jury is not well suited to expressing
the national standard of obscenity and either scrutinize the material
before submitting it to the jury or require evidence as to what the
standard is and evidence that the material appeals to prurient interest,
there is some protection for the defendant against the subjective
speculation of the jury. At least one court, however, while allowing
expert testimony, has held that the jury is not bound to accept it, even
where the experts are uncontradicted.'3 And another court, viewing
the jury's verdict as, in Learned Hand's terms, "a small bit of legis-
lation ad hoc, like the standard of care," "' has held that such testimony
is not a necessary part of the government's case. 38
The preceding cases show the great difficulty courts have had in
arriving at and applying an appropriate standard against which to
measure the obscenity of a particular work. The appeal to "con-
temporary community standards," if taken as referring to those
of particular state or local communities, may be held violative of
constitutional guarantees of free speech. Yet, when the standard is
taken as referring to the nation as a whole, it proves to be essentially
illusory, for no juror can truly stand apart from his own notions of
what is obscene or offensive and apply those national standards which
as yet have not been satisfactorily defined by any court. As a result,
the "guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with obscenity must
depend in the final analysis upon the personal judgment and attitudes
of particular individuals and the place where the trial is held." '
185 Id. at 617 (dissenting opinion).
136 Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1959).
137 United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
1sKahni v. United States, 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859
(1962).
139 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480 (1966) (dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Black).
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It is within this context of conflicting regional standards as to
what is or is not obscene that we must judge the propriety of converting
the mailing of obscenity into a continuing offense which can be prose-
cuted not only in any district where mailed or received but also in
any district through which the material passes. The present state of
obscenity law, if it requires a national standard (as is often uncritically
assumed), puts the courts in the curious position of attempting to
enforce a statute in terms of a national standard although the statute
was passed expressly to enable government prosecutors to take ad-
vantage of local standards. This statutory intent becomes apparent
from an examination of the legislative history.
As was mentioned earlier in this Comment,140 the 1958 amend-
ments to the obscenity statutes had been intended to get around the
restrictive venue imposed by the Ross decision. While the House of
Representatives wanted from the first to provide for prosecution not
only where obscene matter was mailed or received but also in any
intervening district, the broad provision ran into some difficulty in
the Senate. Rather than accept the House version, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, under the leadership of Senator Kefauver, amended the
House bill so as to allow prosecution only at the place of mailing or
receipt. The Committee made it clear in its report that it considered
this to be a reasonable compromise between Ross and the House
measure:
The committee adopts this middle view on the ground that
unrestricted "forum shopping" can lead to abuses and is,
therefore, against public policy. . . . The main evil to be
combatted is the harm done to those who are exposed to
obscene -material at the point of receipt. . . . Thus the main
problem is effectively dealt with while public policy against
providing too many forums from which to select is satisfied
by the elimination of prosecutions in judicial districts through
which the nonmailable material passes. ...
Another public policy deserving of mention is the need
to prevent unwarranted Federal encroachment into the crim-
inal field. The test of settling local penal problems locally is
still a good test, and it is believed that this bill meets it.""
Published along with the report was a May 17, 1957, letter from the
General Counsel of the Post Office to Emanuel Celler, chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, discussing the Ross decision and explain-
ing that "the importance of this decision rests in the fact that it is
sometimes difficult to obtain a conviction for the mailing of obscene
140 See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
141 S. REP. No. 1839, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
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matter in certain jurisdictions." 142 The Senate insisted upon its
amendments, and Patrick Hillings, a member of the House Judiciary
Committee and a House conferee on the bill, claimed on the floor of
the House that the Senate had "torpedoed" the bill:
Mr. Speaker, the question of venue usually seems to be
somewhat of an esoteric legal matter about which laymen are
confused .. . [V]enue is a question of neighborhood-the
neighborhood in which a crime is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and is therefore to be prosecuted. . . . [A]s H.R.
6239 was torpedoed in the Senate, the broadened venue pro-
vision is absent. If insufficient evidence could be gathered
to support a prosecution in the Federal district of mailing or
receipt, or if an overworked grand jury could not attend to
the matter in time, or if for any other reason an indictment
and prosecution could not be speedily secured in one of those
Federal districts, the smut dealer would be perfectly free to
continue his operations, notwithstanding that other evidence
in another Federal district might be readily available to sup-
port an indictment and prosecution.'43
In conference the Senate members agreed to accept the House version.
The Conference Report is particularly interesting for the way it dealt
with the original Senate concerns over forum-shopping:
Question has been raised as to whether the Post Office
Department intends to press for the prosecution of violations
of the law in the jurisdictions through which the unlawfully
mailed matter passes in transit, if the language of the House
of Representatives is restored to the bill by the conferees.
In a letter dated August 5, 1958 and addressed to the chair-
man of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the General
Counsel of the Post Office Department, Mr. Herbert B.
Warburton stated that the Post Office Department answers
this question "emphatically" in the negative."'
It is difficult to understand why Congress and the Post Office would
fight for inclusion in the statute of intervening district venue if their
intent was that this provision not be utilized. Despite the Post Office
Department's assurances that intervening district venue would not be
used, it is clear that, by providing for such 'venue in addition to
venue in the districts of mailing and receipt, the legislative intent was
to facilitate more successful prosecutions for mailing obscenity by
142 Id. at 4.
14a 104 CoNG. Rnc. 15610-11 (1958).
144 RM REP'. No. 2624, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958),
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allowing government prosecutors the widest possible venue alternatives
in order that they might be able to bring criminal proceedings in areas
where sympathetic juries could be expected." 4 Nor is this conclusion
negatived by the fact that no prosecution has apparently yet been
brought in an intervening district alleging violation of the obscenity
laws.
It is, of course, impossible, except perhaps by extensive research
involving great expenditures of time and money, to prove the effect
which the existence of laws such as this has upon authors, publishers
and distributors of books. One cannot point to the book refused pub-
lication, to the book never ordered by a distant bookstore or to the
book refused distribution because "doubtful." If the impact of these
laws were to be limited to so-called hard core pornography, and if it
could be shown that the standard likely to be applied to such material
would vary only slightly from community to community, such re-
straints on the free dissemination of written works might be justifiable
because de minimis. In the light of the decisions discussed above,
however, it becomes clear that such hard core pornography will be only
a part of that body of works which will fall under the ban of the censor,
and that hard core pornography is no easier to define than any other
kind. In addition, a work not inherently obscene in itself may prove
to be so solely by virtue of provocative, though not inherently obscene,
merchandising and advertising. 46 Surely then the lack of certainty
as to the standard of obscenity, procedural rules designed to take ad-
vantage of local prejudices and sectional provincialism and, above all,
the ever constant threat that a dubious or borderline work may subject
one to multiple prosecutions in distant jurisdictions for each act of
mailing, cannot fail to exert a repressive effect on free speech and press
in the United States.
The inevitable tendency is to make the serious author timid,
to cramp his mind so that the books he is not afraid to write
will fall far below the level of his abilities. And society, as
a consequence of the anxiety to suppress smut at all costs,
may lose the values of important literary, scientific, and edu-
cational contributions. 147
Some courts 148 have attempted to justify the extension of the
continuing offense doctrine into new areas of criminal law on grounds
145 See Hearings on Control of Obscene Material Before Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Amendments and Subcommittee To Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 16-18 (1960).
See also STAFF OF SUBCOMMITE ON POSTAL OPERATIONS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 86TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT ON OBSCENE MATTER
SENT THMOUGH THE MAIL 7 (Comm. Print 1959).
14 6 See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
147 Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law of Obscenity and The Constitution,
38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 373 (1954). :
148 United States v. Cores; 356 U.S. 405, 410 (1958); United States -v. Cashin,
281 F.2d 669, 675 (2d Cir. 1960).
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that the dangers inherent in the doctrine have been ameliorated by the
promulgation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b), which
provides for change of venue when, in the discretion of the judge, such
a change would be in the interest of justice. Because of the large
discretionary element, however, this rule has proved less of a safe-
guard than might be anticipated. In many obscenity cases courts
have construed the rule in such a way as to rob it of any protective
value for the defendant. In United States v. West Coast News Co.,"
the California defendants had been indicted in Michigan for mailing
obscene materials. The defendants' Los Angeles attorney moved under
Rule 21 (b) to transfer the case to the Southern District of California
on grounds of physical and financial hardship and the possibility of
being subjected to multiple prosecutions on the basis of differing com-
munity standards. The motion was refused as not being in the in-
terests of justice. Although the court stressed the right of a Michigan
jury to apply local standards, the court also held that, while un-
doubtedly the defendants, their attorneys and their witnesses would be
inconvenienced by having to travel to Michigan, the government wit-
nesses would be equally inconvenienced were the trial transferred to
California. Since there was no district convenient for all, there was
no need to transfer the proceedings. This ruling was challenged by
the defendants the following year 150 when a new motion was made
for a change of venue based on the facts that in the interim period
the Manual decision had made the appropriate standard of obscenity
a national standard and that one defendant had since suffered a heart
attack. Once again the transfer was not found to be in the interest of
justice. The court reiterated the importance that a Michigan jury
have the opportunity to pass on the material in question and indicated
its approval of Toscano v. Olesen, in which another court had said,
"we need not concern ourselves with the possible hardship resulting
from the exercise of this power. For that affects policy. Our function
is merely to give effect to it." 151
The defendants in United States v. Luros 1 52 were Californians
indicted in Iowa for conspiracy to violate the obscenity statutes and
for allegedly sending obscene materials into Iowa from Hollywood.
It is interesting to note that the very materials alleged to be obscene
in the Iowa proceedings had already been held not to be obscene in
prior proceedings in the California state courts. The defendants moved
for change of venue under Rule 21 (b) on grounds that going to trial
in Iowa would prevent them from meeting business and family re-
149 30 F.R.D. 13 (W.D. Mich. 1962).
16o United States v. West Coast News Co., 216 F. Supp. 911 (W.D. Mich. 1963).
151Toscano v. Olesen, 184 F. Supp. 296, 297 (S.D. Cal. 1960). (Emphasis in
original.)
152 243 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Iowa), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 956 (1965).
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sponsibilities, would physically and financially tax their resources by
requiring transportation of witnesses and attorneys to Iowa and would
require a considerable outlay for living expenses during the trial. The
court held:
The defendants are in effect, advocating a prosecutive policy
which would compel local residents to wait for relief until
some United States Attorney in another district saw fit to act.
. . . To do so, would deny the residents of this district the
lawful means to protect themselves from local distributions of
obscene materials. It would mark a partial return to the pro-
secutive limitations which existed under the now discredited
decision in United States v. Ross.'
The court found the legislative intent behind making the alleged
crimes continuing to be that of allowing local juries to rule on offensive
material and that "the strength of this congressional feeling is in-
dicated by Congress' willingness to override the important policy con-
siderations behind Rule 21 (b)." "
Despite this court's weak disclaimers elsewhere in the opinion, the
effect of its decision and reasoning is essentially to render Rule 21 (b)
inapplicable in cases in which there is a clear statutory grant of venue
by Congress which takes precedence over the discretionary power of a
district court to transfer the case in the interest of justice. There is
some authority the other way. Thus, in. United States v. Olen,'55 a
New York district court, in a case involving alleged violations of the
Securities Act of 1933,156 was faced with a Rule 21 (b) motion to
transfer the trial to Alabama. The company involved had its home
office and books in Alabama, the prospectus had been mailed in Alabama
and the defendants and most witnesses resided in Alabama. The
court in ruling on the motion held that under the rationale of Johnson,
a criminal statute had to be construed, if possible, so as to lay venue
at the home of the defendant:
I am not unaware of the fact that when former 28 U.S.C.
§ 103 was incorporated in revised Title 18 U.S.C. in 1948
as Section 3237 . . . it was amended to "meet the situation
created by" United States v. Johnson. However, the amend-
ment does not at all act to restrict but rather to broaden the
number of jurisdictions in which a criminal trial may be
had in the case of continuing offenses.'57
158 Id. at 176. The reference to "prosecutive limitations" is to the Ross court's de-
cision that venue could properly be laid only in the place of mailing. See note 89
supra and accompanying text.
154 243 F. Supp. at 176.
155 183 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
1-5648 Stat 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
1 7 183 F. Supp. at 217 n.4.
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The court then went on to find that the crimes had been "begun" in
Alabama so as to fall within the first paragraph of section 3237 and
granted the transfer.
Within recent months Rule 21 (b) has been amended so as to
increase its flexibility and usefulness. Under the new rule, where
convenience of the parties and the witnesses and the interest of justice
would best be served by trial in a district in which no part of the
offense was committed, transfer to such district may be ordered. 58
But it should be emphasized again that the rule is discretionary, and
refusals of transfer are subject to only narrow review as to abuse of
discretion of the court,59 and reviewable on mandamus only in
extraordinary circumstances.'60 Some courts, such as Cores, have
argued that the greater the number of possible places of venue the more
likely it is that the defendant will find a convenient forum to which
he can transfer his case. This argument is based on erroneous assump-
tions as to the availability of transfer and the adequacy of the transfer
provisions. Particularly in obscenity cases, the emphasis on community
standards has encouraged local courts to retain cases which in less
emotionally tinged areas of the law might be granted transfer. Cer-
tainly, unless transfer can be easily obtained, the only effect of loose
interpretations of venue provisions will be to provide the government
with a very broad choice of forums. And, "conceivably Rule 21 (b),
which was obviously designed to afford greater protection to defend-
ants, may in practice merely provide an excuse for venue constructions
which hold a great potential for abuse by the government." "" The
tendency for courts to retain control of these cases may also be in-
creased by the recent Supreme Court decision in Platt v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co.16' The Court, holding that the court of appeals
in ordering transfer under Rule 21(b) had improperly usurped a
district court function, reiterated that there was no constitutional right
to trial in a defendant's home district and that proper determination
of where the crime was committed was essential to lay venue." It may
be significant, however, that this case involved a corporate defendant.
15 8 Under the old Rule 21 (b) some courts had held that all counts of a multi-count
indictment had to be transferable or change of venue could not be ordered. Thus a
prosecutor needed only to include in the indictment a single count having venue only
in the preferred district to prevent transfer of all other counts. But see United States
v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1960), holding that each count in a multi-count indict-
ment is severable and may be transferred independently of any other to the district
where the offense was allegedly committed.
159 See Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964).
16o United States v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1960).
161 Abrams 818.
:62 376 U.S. 240 (1964) (violation of Sherman Act).
163 The fact that Minnesota is the main office or "home' of the respondent
has no independent significance in determining whether transfer to that dis-
trict would be "in the interest of justice," although it may be considered with
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In view of the difficulty a defendant in an obscenity case faces in
obtaining a change of venue under Rule 21 (b) and the likelihood that
a jury will apply local standards in judging the obscenity of the mate-
rials being questioned, it might be thought that the defendant's best
recourse would be to waive jury trial altogether. Under Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, jury trial can be
waived only with the approval of both the court and the government
prosecutor. The constitutionality of this requirement has recently been
upheld,'M the only limitation apparently being that the prosecution is
under a duty not to withhold consent arbitrarily. The government,
therefore, could make particularly effective use of this rule, after
selecting a venue distant from the defendant's home or place of business,
by refusing to consent to waiver of jury and then using its peremptory
challenges to remove the more educated and literate jurors.' 65
Another potential source of governmental abuse of its venue powers
may result from combining the inherently broad venue possibilities of
conspiracy (based on where an overt act takes place 166) with the inter-
vening district venue possibilities of the obscenity cases, although no
such cases have been discovered. In most cases the effect of joining
a count charging a substantive offense with conspiracy charges is to
limit the venue possibilities open to the prosecution. By combining
a continuing mailing offense with conspiracy charges, however, venue
over the conspiracy could conceivably be extended to any place through
which the mail passed on the theory that the mailing was an overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that the
government prosecutor in any indictment for the mailing of obscenity
possesses tremendous discretionary power to decide where the prosecu-
tion will be brought and, thereby, to decide which standards of ob-
scenity will be applied. The defendant may, consistently with section
3237, be brought to trial not only where he physically placed the ques-
tionable material in the mails (the district of deposit), or the destina-
tion to which the material was sent and where it presumably had its
adverse effect (the district of receipt), but also any district between
that of deposit and receipt through which the mail might happen to
pass (although such intervening districts do not seem to have been
used as yet by government prosecutors). One writer has estimated
that a truck travelling or a letter mailed from Los Angeles to New
:164 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
165 See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Consti-
tutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 110 n.597 (1960), for a suggestion by defense
counsel in Alexander v. United States, 271 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1959), that these trial
tactics were used in that prosecution by the United States Attorney.
16 6 The government might successfully be able to prosecute for conspiracy recipi-
ents of obscene material for private consumption-even though receipt of obscene
materials for private use has been held not to violate § 1461. United States v. Sidelko,
248 F. Supp. 813 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
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York City might pass through more than one dozen federal judicial
districts." 7  Conceivably, then, a publisher, distributor or author of
allegedly obscene material might be faced with a trial in any one of
those more than twelve intervening districts, in which the same
printed material might be subjected to twelve different appraisals as
to whether it offends the national standard. Nor is that all. Since
each act of mailing is a separate offense, the mailer may be subjected to
multiple indictments for very similar material with the possibly in-
congruous result that one mailing would result in conviction but another
mailing to another part of the country would not. It is difficult to
believe that this potentially nationwide venue which essentially makes
the United States one giant federal district is at all consonant with
traditional notions of fair play or more importantly with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to protect all criminal defendants
from the undue physical and financial hardship and possible emotional
intimidation inherent in transportation to distant places for trial. If
such a system has little justification even in the ordinary criminal
trial, how much less must be the legitimacy of extending this potentially
repressive legislation into the area of first amendment freedoms of
speech and press. Taken together with the hardship of trial far from
home, the fear of conflicting and unpredictable verdicts based on
government exploitation of local prejudices can have no other effect
but to restrict free expression. Nor will it be only the purveyor of
hard core pornography who is made cautious; the serious book vendor
and the artist, faced with their inability to predict local reaction to
particular works in a time of rapidly changing public mores and
customs, will be forced to choose between the integrity of their art
and business and the risk of financial and reputational ruin. The
Supreme Court has distinguished in the past those legal devices which
might be consistent with constitutional guarantees in most applications,
but which could not be applied in settings where they had "the collateral
effect of inhibiting freedom of expression by making the individual
more reluctant to exercise it." 108 A man, the Court continued, "may
the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemina-
tion of ideas may be the loser." '9 Certainly such a description might
fairly be said to characterize the continuing offense concept as it affects
the obscenity statutes..
What is being questioned here is not the power of Congress to
regulate what shall constitute nonmailable matter but rather the neces-
sity that the government use such power in a manner consonant with
the more important constitutional guarantees set down in the first and
sixth amendments. In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, "the postal
power, like all its other powers, is subject to the limitations of the
107 Abrams 794-95.
168 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
109 Ibid.
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Bill of Rights. . . Congress may not through its postal power put
limitations upon the freedom of the press which directly attempted
would be unconstitutional." :'7
By transforming the mailing of obscenity into a continuing offense,
thus allowing prosecution at places other than where the mail was de-
posited, Congress has bestowed upon the government prosecutor wider
powers than are necessary for dealing with the evil to be attacked. It is
not sufficient justification for allowing prosecution at the point of de-
livery that local juries have the right to apply standards more restrictive
than those deemed proper by their more sophisticated countrymen. It
may, of course, be argued that venue at the place of delivery, as opposed
to venue laid in an intervening district, is desirable on the ground that
this is where the obscene material has its impact and where the de-
fendant is perpetrating the harm that society seeks to prevent. If,
however, this local concern is implemented by use of local standards
to judge the material in question, then trial in the place of delivery
will both deprive a defendant of the protections of the sixth amendment
and transgress constitutional provisions for free speech. If, on the
other hand, the standards intended to be used are national, then the
interests of the local area where the material was received can just as
well be served by having a jury in the area where the material was
mailed apply the very same standard in judging its obscenity. This
alternative will at the same time accord the defendant the full pro-
tection and freedom from hardship guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
Even less justifiable than allowing venue to be laid-in the place of
delivery is that provision which allows for prosecution in any state
through which the obscenity may have passed in the course of mailing.
The obscene matter has had no impact in such jurisdictions nor has
the disseminator purposely availed himself of doing business in that
state or intentionally intruded himself in any way. It is no answer to
this complaint that the "gist" of the offense is the use of the mails and
so prosecution is proper wherever the mails are used. The essence
of the offense is disseminating obscenity, and the purpose of the statute
is not to protect the integrity or sanctity of the United States mails
per se, but to stop the flow of material deemed harmful to national
standards of decency. Lastly, it is no justification for granting the
government the power to prosecute in intervening districts that the
government has as yet exercised this power only infrequently in other
areas and not at all in obscenity cases. For whether this dearth of
cases is attributable to commendable restraint by government prose-
cutors, or, as is more likely, to fear that free use of the power will
result in judicial reappraisal of its propriety, the power still exists-
a potential club ready for use in unusual cases-no less chilling in its
effect on free speech for being unused.
170 Milwaukee Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407i 430-31- (1921) (dissenting
opinion).
